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OPINION OF THE COURT 
          
 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
 These consolidated appeals arise out of the bankruptcy of 
Jason Realty, L.P., a single-asset, New Jersey limited 
partnership that owns and operates a two-story retail and office 
building.  On this property, First Fidelity Bank, N.A., holds a 
note, a mortgage, and an assignment of rents.  At issue here is 
the assignment agreement, which assigned the rents, income and 
profits from the property to the bank, but granted Jason Realty 
the privilege to collect the rents until the event of default.  
Jason Realty defaulted prior to filing its Chapter 11 petition.  
The parties now dispute title to the rents. 
 The major question for decision is whether the assignment 
was an absolute assignment, as interpreted by the district court, 
or a collateral pledge, as construed by the bankruptcy court.  We 
agree with the district court that the assignment vested First 
Fidelity with title to the rents and granted Jason Realty a 
  
license to collect the rents until default.  Upon default, Jason 
Realty had no interest in the rents.  Accordingly, the rents are 
not property of the estate and are not available as cash 
collateral nor as a funding source for the debtor's 
reorganization plan.  Therefore, we will affirm the orders of the 
district court. 
 The orders of the bankruptcy judge and the district court 
are final and appealable.  Commerce Bank v. Mountain View 
Village, Inc., 5 F.3d 34, 36-37 (3d Cir. 1993).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).  Because there is no 
dispute as to the facts presented below, the interpretation and 
application of the assignment contract and the Bankruptcy Code 
raise only questions of law subject to plenary review.  See In re 
Deseno, 17 F.3d 642, 643 (3d Cir. 1994); FRG, Inc. v. Manley, 919 
F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
 I. 
 The contest here is between Jason Realty, L.P., the debtor, 
and First Fidelity Bank, N.A., a creditor.  Jason Realty is the 
owner of commercial real estate in Aberdeen, New Jersey.  On 
September 14, 1989, Jason Realty executed a promissory note in 
favor of Howard Savings Bank for the repayment of approximately 
$750,000.00.  On this date, it also executed two additional 
agreements: a mortgage and an assignment of leases.  The 
assignment provided: 
 THAT the Assignor for good and valuable consideration, 
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, hereby grants, 
transfers and assigns to the Assignee the entire 
  
lessor's interest in and to those certain leases . . . 
TOGETHER with all rents, income and profits arising 
from said leases. 
App. at 78.  The assignment included the following "terms, 
covenants and conditions": 
 So long as there shall exist no default by the 
Assignor in the payment of the principal sum, interest 
and indebtedness secured hereby and by said Note and 
Mortgage, . . . the Assignor shall have the privilege 
to collect . . . all rents, income and profits arising 
under said leases or from the premises described 
therein and to retain, use and enjoy the same. * * * 
 
 Upon payment in full of the principal sum, interest 
and indebtedness secured hereby and by said Note and 
Mortgage, this Assignment shall become and be void and 
of no effect. 
App. at 80 and 82.  On October 2, 1992, First Fidelity purchased 
the note, mortgage and assignment from Howard Savings Bank. 
 Jason Realty defaulted on the note by failing to make the 
principal and interest payments due on November 1, 1993, and each 
month thereafter.  On January 28, 1994, First Fidelity sent 
notices to the tenants of the mortgaged property demanding that 
they pay their rent directly to First Fidelity.  On March 3, 
1994, First Fidelity instituted a foreclosure action in a New 
Jersey state court, and on March 18 filed an application for 
appointment of a receiver.  One week thereafter, Jason Realty 
filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition.  Accordingly, the 
foreclosure action was stayed. 
 On April 4, 1994, the bankruptcy court authorized Jason 
Realty's preliminary use of the rents to pay expenses in 
accordance with the budget submitted to the court and set a final 
  
hearing date for April 25, 1994.  At the final hearing, the 
bankruptcy court held that the rents, amounting to approximately 
$12,500 per month, constituted cash collateral and granted Jason 
Realty's motion for continued use of cash collateral.  The court 
also directed Jason Realty to pay First Federal $6,041.00 per 
month as adequate protection.  The court entered a final order 
authorizing the debtor's continued use of cash collateral.  First 
Fidelity filed an appeal to the district court which reversed the 
bankruptcy court's order and held that the rents were not 
property of the estate and could not be used as cash collateral.  
The appeal at No. 94-5691 challenges this order.   
 On November 8, 1994, First Fidelity moved for relief from 
the automatic stay.  Jason Realty filed a cross-motion seeking to 
compel First Fidelity to pay operating expenses for the real 
property under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c).  On December 5, 1994, the 
bankruptcy court issued an order granting relief from the 
automatic stay and denying the cross-motion.  Jason appealed to 
the district court, which affirmed.  The appeal at No. 95-5133 
challenges this order. 
 
 II. 
 The issue before us is whether the assigned rents should 
have been classified as property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 
541(a)(1).  Property of the estate consists of all property in 
which the debtor holds an interest upon the commencement of 
bankruptcy.  See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6).  Generally, a debtor-in-
possession, as trustee, see 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a), is free to use, 
  
sell or lease property of the bankruptcy estate in the operation 
of the debtor's business.  See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1).  Thus, 
classification of the instant rents is significant because the 
rents could become part of the bankruptcy estate and fund the 
debtor's reorganization. 
 The district court concluded that Jason Realty had no 
interest in the rents at the commencement of bankruptcy on March 
25, 1994, because it had assigned the rents on September 14, 
1989.  Although Jason Realty had a license to collect the rents, 
the license was revoked when Jason Realty defaulted on the note 
on November 1, 1993, prior to the commencement of bankruptcy. 
 Jason Realty argues (and the bankruptcy court held1) that 
the estate held an interest in the rents, because the assignment 
merely pledged the rents as security.  Jason Realty contends that 
it retained title to the rents and that the rents are now "cash 
                     
1
.  The bankruptcy court did not supply detailed reasoning in its 
oral opinion that held that this was not an absolute assignment.  
The court "incorporated the extensive analysis in the Debtor's 
papers as its own opinion," Appellant's Brief at 13, and stated: 
 
 I don't think I can really add anything to the reasons 
stated in opposition by the debtor, because I believe 
they're all well stated and I believe the authorities 
are on point and correct.  The Pennsylvania case, the 
Third Circuit case [Commerce Bank] involving 
Pennsylvania law is not applicable here for the simple 
reason that Pennsylvania is a title state not a lien 
state.  And the Soreles (sic) case is on point and you 
can no more take the rents here without Court order 
than you could do it in foreclosure without getting a 
receiver appointed.  In any event, for all of the 
reasons stated in the debtor's opposing papers, the 
objection is overruled. 
   
App. at 149. 
  
collateral."  Cash collateral takes many forms and includes "the 
... rents ... of property subject to security interest as 
provided in section 552(b) of this title."  11 U.S.C. § 363(a).  
Subject to certain conditions, a bankruptcy court may authorize 
the use of cash collateral by a debtor.  Id. 
 We must determine whether the assignment conveyed title to 
First Fidelity or, instead, pledged the rents as security.  
Assignments of rents are interests in real property and, as such, 
are created and defined in accordance with the law of the situs 
of the real property.  Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 
(1979); Commerce Bank, 5 F.3d at 37.  A federal court in 
bankruptcy is not allowed to upend the property law of the state 
in which it sits, for to do so would encourage forum shopping and 
allow a party to receive "a windfall merely by reason of the 
happenstance of bankruptcy."  Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.  Thus, in 
determining whether the parties' assignment of rents transferred 
title or, instead, created a "security interest," our goal must 
be to ensure that First Fidelity "is afforded in federal 
bankruptcy court the same protection [it] would have under state 
law if no bankruptcy had ensued."  Id. at 56.  We thus turn to 
New Jersey law to classify the parties' interests in the rents. 
 
 III. 
 It is settled in New Jersey that an assignment of rents 
passes title to the assignee.  Paramount Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of 
City of Newark v. Sacks, 107 N.J. Eq. 328, 152 A. 457 (N.J. Ch. 
1930).  An assignment of a right is a manifestation of the 
  
assignor's intention to transfer it by virtue of which the 
assignor's right to performance by the obligor is extinguished in 
whole or in part and the assignee acquires right to such 
performance.   Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317; see 
generally Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92, 484 A.2d 675, 678-79 
(N.J. 1984). The precise wording determines the effect of the 
assignment.  See In re Winslow Center Assocs., 50 B.R. 679, 681 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 17 
B.R. 829, 834 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Matter of Glen Properties 
168 B.R. 537 (D.N.J. 1993). 
 An absolute assignment transfers title to the assignee upon 
its execution.  New Jersey Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolf, 108 
N.J. Eq. 412, 155 A. 372 (N.J. Ch. 1931).  An assignment is 
absolute if its language demonstrates an intent to transfer 
immediately the assignor's rights and title to the rents.  In re 
Winslow Center Assocs., 50 B.R. at 681-82 (applying New Jersey 
law).  The instant assignment was quintessentially absolute, 
because it was a total assignment in per verba de praesenti:  
Jason Realty "hereby grants, transfers and assigns to the 
assignee the entire lessor's interest in and to those certain 
leases ... Together with all rents."  These parties mutually 
agreed in words of the present to transfer full title to the 
rents.  This exchange inescapably and unambiguously expressed an 
agreement to assign present title. 
 Notwithstanding this language, Jason Realty argues that the 
overall effect of the assignment was to create a pledge for 
security.  It contends that the assignment was collateral and 
  
effected (only) a future transfer of rights dependent upon a 
later default.  Jason Realty lists several characteristics of 
this assignment that, it suggests, indicate the assignment was 
collateral: (1) the assignment was part of a financing 
transaction; (2) the mortgage acknowledged that the assignment 
was given as "additional security"; (3) the assignment was made 
"for the purpose of securing [t]he payment of the principal sum, 
interest and indebtedness by a certain Note" and referenced "the 
indebtedness secured hereby"; (4) rights and liabilities were set 
forth in the event that First Fidelity acquired title (indicating 
a future event); (5) upon payment of the indebtedness, the 
assignment would be null and void, thus reverting the rents to 
Jason Realty; (6) the debt to First Fidelity was not extinguished 
or reduced upon execution of the assignment in 1989 or upon 
enforcement in 1994; (7) First Fidelity was obligated to apply 
the fruits of the assignment to the amount due on the note; and 
(8) Jason Realty's use of the rents was unrestricted. 
 Appellant's contention is unavailing.  We are not moved by 
the fact that the assignment was part of a financing transaction 
and served as additional security for repayment of the note.  An 
assignment clause within a mortgage may be independent of the 
mortgage security.  New Jersey Nat'l Bank & Trust Company, 108 
N.J.Eq. at 414; 155 A. at 373 (citing Stanton v. Metropolitan 
Lumber Company, 107 N.J. Eq. 345, 152 A. 653 (Ch. 1930)).  
Moreover, we are impressed that the instant assignment was 
contained in an agreement separate from the mortgage.  First 
Fidelity proceeded here as an assignee of rents under rights 
  
conferred on a special instrument bearing the title "Assignment 
of Lease or Leases,"  App. at 78, and not in its capacity as a 
mortgagee enforcing rights contained in the instrument bearing 
the title "mortgage."  App. at 55. 
 It also is well-established under New Jersey law that an 
absolute assignment may have conditions.  Stanton, 107 N.J. Eq. 
at 348, 152 A. at 654-55.  The fact that a right is conditional 
on the performance of a return promise or is otherwise 
conditional does not prevent its assignment before the condition 
occurs.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §§ 320 and 331.  
Under New Jersey law, an assignment may be conditioned upon 
default.  In Stanton, the court interpreted an assignment clause 
in a mortgage that provided "if default be made . . . said rents 
and profits are . . . assigned to the mortgagee."  108 N.J.Eq. at 
346; 155 A. at 654.  The court stated: 
 Th[is] assignment, though conditional, became absolute 
upon default of the mortgage debt, and was valid and 
enforceable against the assignor; . . . As the rents 
accrued, after the default, the ownership was in the 
assignee; . . .  
 
 The assignment is not, as contended, an assignment of 
rents as may accrue after the mortgagee should enter 
into possession, and conditional upon its entering 
into possession or upon the appointment of a receiver.  
The provisions of the mortgage above quoted grants the 
right to take possession upon default; in addition the 
rents are assigned upon default; . . . The assignment 
of rents is distinct and independent of the means 
granted the mortgagee to collect them.  The title to 
them was to pass to the mortgagee upon default whether 
the procedure was or not adopted, not that it was to 
pass only if it was set in motion.   
  
Id. at 348, 152 A. at 654-55 (emphasis added).  We have not been 
directed to any New Jersey authority that overrules, amends or in 
any way dilutes these authorities. 
 The instrument evidences an absolute assignment of title to 
the rents, with the assignor receiving a license to collect the 
rents.  Our reasoning is informed by Judge Debevoise of the 
District of New Jersey, who interpreted a similar assignment 
clause in Matter of Glen Properties, 168 B.R. 537 (D.N.J. 1993).  
That assignment provided that the assignor "for value received . 
. . does hereby sell, assign, transfer, set over and deliver unto 
the Assignee all leases . . . together with the immediate and 
continuing right to collect and receive all of the rents."  Id. 
at 540-41.  The assignment also provided "That so long as there 
shall exist no default by Assignor in the payment of any 
indebtedness secured hereby, Assignor shall have the right under 
a license granted hereby . . . to collect upon . . . all of said 
rents."  Id. at 540.  We fail to perceive a meaningful difference 
between the assignment clause in Glen Properties and the 
assignment presently before us, and concur in Judge Debevoise's 
conclusion that it is "quite clear" that such language evidences 
an absolute assignment.  Id. at 541. 
 Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that the 
rents were assigned to First Fidelity and were not property of 
the bankruptcy estate. 
 
 IV. 
  
 In part III, we conclude that the law of New Jersey is 
clear.  And, of course, the bankruptcy courts are strictly bound 
to apply this state's law to property interests under the 
teachings of Butner.  Yet the bankruptcy judge here concluded 
that an assignment, absolute on the face of the instrument, was 
collateral.  Apparently, this result is borne of misgivings on 
the part of the bankruptcy court regarding the repercussions that 
our holding in Commerce Bank, interpreting Pennsylvania law, 
would have on single-asset reorganizations in New Jersey.  See 
Commerce Bank, 5 F.3d at 38.  Although our decision here may 
create serious obstacles for debtors whose sole income stream is 
rents, Butner mandates that we interpret the assignment as New 
Jersey courts would construe it outside the bankruptcy context.  
Our review of the bankruptcy court's holding in this case and of 
those in In re Mocco, 176 B.R. 335 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995) and in In 
re Princeton Overlook Joint Venture, 143 B.R. 625 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
1992), suggest the need to reemphasize the interaction of the 
mandates of the Bankruptcy Code, the principle of Butner and the 
doctrine of stare decisis.2 
                     
2
.  In In re Mocco, 176 B.R. 335 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995), for 
example, a bankruptcy court was faced with an assignment almost 
identical in language to the one before us.  In its 
interpretation, the bankruptcy judge refused even to address the 
reasoning of the Chief Judge of the District of New Jersey in 
this case, stating, "this court is not bound by Jason, an 
unpublished opinion."  Id. at 342 n.4.  The bankruptcy judge also 
refused to follow the New Jersey district court precedent in the 
published opinion in Matter of Glen Properties, saying flatly, 
"This court disagrees."  Id. at 345. 
  
 In a reorganization under Chapter 11, a bankruptcy court's 
objective is to preserve, if possible, an ongoing business.  The 
perennial problem facing bankruptcy judges is to strike a proper 
balance between rights of the creditor and debtor.  To do this, 
the judges make wide use of equitable and discretionary powers as 
provided by the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.  Judges recognize that 
in many cases, especially single-asset cases involving commercial 
real estate, the use of cash collateral by the debtor is 
essential to a successful reorganization.  They recognize that 
the only source of potential cash collateral is the rent 
generated by the leases.  Understandably, they will endeavor to 
craft a recovery that will permit some use of the rents by the 
debtor. 
 Under New Jersey law, however, such a goal cannot be 
reached by merging the rights of an assignee of leases with those 
of a mortgagee.  These concepts are not fungible, but embrace 
separate and distinct attributes of property law, as well as 
degrees of gradation of title and basic differences as to how and 
when title passes between the debtor and the secured creditor.  
Thus, in the case at bar, although it was clear that First 
Fidelity was proceeding as an assignee of leases, the bankruptcy 
judge refused to follow the teachings of Commerce Bank on the 
basis that mortgages are treated differently in New Jersey than 
in Pennsylvania:  Pennsylvania is "a title state and not a lien 
state."  App. at 149.  The judge confused assignee apples with 
mortgagee oranges. 
  
 We have found this same confusion in other cases where 
there is a substantial issue of an assignee's right to rents.  
See, e.g., In re Mocco and In re Princeton Overlook Joint 
Venture.  There is often a failure to recognize the differences 
between those cases where the mortgagee attempts to collect rents 
solely on the strength of the mortgage instruments, see Eisen v. 
Kostakos, 282 A.2d 421 (N.J.App. Div. 1971); Scult v. Bergen 
Valley Builders, Inc., 197 A.2d 704 (N.J.App. Div. 1964), and 
instances where the creditor proceeds solely, as here, as an 
assignee under an assignment of rents clause, see Stanton v. 
Metropolitan Lumber Co., 152 A. 653 (N.J.Ch. 1930); In re Winslow 
Center Assoc., 50 B.R. 679 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1985). 
 As we note, this confusion appears in the present case.  In 
its decision, the bankruptcy court relied on Midlantic Nat'l Bank 
v. Sourlis, 141 B.R. 826 (D.N.J. 1992), in which the court 
addressed whether the assignee/creditor had an interest in rents 
for the purposes of Section 363.  In Sourlis, the court held that 
an assignee had "a perfected security interest in the rents as of 
the date of proper state-law recordation."  Id. at 834.  Although 
the court in Sourlis spoke only of creditors having security 
interests in rents, the court did not address the possibility 
that a debtor could assign all of its rights in rents to the 
creditor.  It therefore provides little guidance here.3   
                     
3
.   The court in Sourlis does, however, give an accurate summary 
of New jersey law on the distinction between the situations in 
which a mortgagee and in which an assignee wish to collect rents:  
 
 Under New Jersey law, a mortgagee must take 
affirmative steps, such as taking possession of the 
  
 Moreover, the facts in Sourlis do not form an appropriate 
analogy to the facts before us, because the creditor took no 
active steps pre-petition to implement the assignment clause.  
The creditor did not direct the tenants to make the payments to 
it prior to the commencement of any bankruptcy proceedings.  The 
creditor "did not seek to take possession of or manage the 
properties or seek the appointment of a receiver prior to the 
debtor's filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 
11."  Id. at 828.  Apparently, the creditor's first attempt to 
assert ownership rights of the rents was in its motion to 
restrain the debtor's use of the rents as cash collateral in the 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
 In conclusion, we have discussed this question at some 
length in order to avoid future confusion.  It is important in 
interpreting New Jersey law that the otherwise worthy desire for 
achieving a reorganization under Chapter 11 should not trump the 
rights of an assignee of a lease under a pre-petition assignment. 
 V. 
(..continued) 
property or securing the appointment of a receiver, to 
entitle the mortgagee to collect rents from the 
mortgaged property.  Eisen, Scult.  However, also 
under New Jersey law, a mortgagee with an assignment 
of rents is entitled to enforce its assignment and 
collect the rents upon default without taking 
possession of the property or seeking the appointment 
of a receiver.  Stanton, Winslow. 
Id. at 831-32. 
 
  
 We are satisfied that our determination of the appeal at 
No. 94-5691 controls the outcome of the appeal at No. 95-5133. 
 A party is entitled to relief from the automatic stay 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) under the following standard: 
 On request of a party in interest and after notice and 
a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay 
provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as 
by terminating, annulling, modifying or conditions 
such stay -- 
 
 * * * * 
 
  (2) with respect to a stay of an act against 
property under subsection (a) of this section, if -- 
 
   (A) the debtor does not have an equity in 
such property; and  
 
   (B) such property is not necessary to an 
effective reorganization. 
 
 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). 
 With respect to the first prong, Jason Realty concedes that 
it has no equity in the real property.  In order to satisfy its 
burden on the second prong, Jason Realty had to demonstrate that 
there was "a reasonable possibility of a successful 
reorganization within a reasonable time."  United Sav. Ass'n v. 
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 376 (1988).  
Jason Realty's proposed plan for reorganization uses the rents 
assigned to First Fidelity to fund the plan.  We previously have 
held that when rents are not property of the debtor's estate, 
they may not be used to fund a plan of reorganization.  Commerce 
Bank, 5 F.3d. at 38.  As a panel of this court, we lack the power 
to overrule the decision of a previous panel; moreover, even if 
  
we had the power, we are not inclined to accept Appellant's 
argument.  We are satisfied that no provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code permits Jason Realty to "create" an interest in the rents to 
enable it to use First Fidelity's property in a plan of 
reorganization.  In the circumstances of this case, the rents are 
unavailable for use, allocation or utilization in any plan 
proposed by Jason Realty.   
 We have considered all arguments advanced by the parties 
and conclude that no further discussion is necessary.  The 
judgments of the district court will be affirmed in all respects. 
